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Abstract 
Does international law afford individual rights to enforce climate action of States and if so, is 
there a legally binding standard of climate protection that domestic courts can apply? The 
Gerechtshof Den Haag (Hague Court of Appeal) in the Urgenda decision of October 2018 has 
answered these questions in the positive. The Hague Court of Appeal thereby acknowledged 
the existence of a ‘duty of care’ in Dutch law based on the European Convention on Human 
Rights. A closer analysis of the judgment reveals that the concrete content of this duty of care is 
not derived from human rights, but from scientifically proven and internationally endorsed 
greenhouse gas emission reduction targets which are imperative to achieve the temperature 
goal of the Paris Agreement. This article analyses the judgment and examines whether it is 
consistent with the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights. It demonstrates 
that the judgment forms part of a tidal wave of judicial enquiry into the accountability of 
governments for their climate action on the basis of human rights and that it is the virtue of 
human rights law to be conducive to resolving the accountability issue of governments for their 
climate action. More evidence is needed to substantiate that a new ‘European Consensus’ 
emerges that comprises not only agreement on an ambitious global temperature goal but 
translates this into individual rights to enforce climate protection.  
Keywords: climate change, duty of care, human rights, positive action doctrine, UNFCCC, Paris 
Agreement, international environmental law, nationally determined contributions, European 
Consensus 
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Introduction 
Despite the fact that climate litigation cases and the pertinent scholarly literature is constantly 
expanding1 and litigation strategies are evolving,2 the Urgenda decision of the Hague Court of 
Appeal of 9 October 2018 is to date a high watermark in approach and outcome.  
The case concerns the claim of Urgenda, a Dutch citizens’ environmental organisation with 
members from various domains in society, whose aim is to stimulate and accelerate the 
transition processes to a more sustainable society. The claimants asserted that the government 
of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (the Netherlands or the State) has acted unlawfully towards 
Urgenda because of its failure to commit to an emission reduction target so that the cumulative 
volume of Dutch greenhouse gas emissions would have been reduced by at least 25% 
compared to the base year of 1990 by the end of 2020.3 
                                                          
1 The Status of Climate Change Litigation. A Global Review (2017), UNEP, available at  <{ HYPERLINK 
"http://wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/20767/climate-change-
litigation.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed" }=>, last accessed 1 February 2019; Daniel Bodansky, Jutta 
Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2017); 
Meredith Wilensky, ‘Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-U.S. Climate Litigation’ (2015) 
26 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 131; Jacqueline Peel and Hari M Osofsky, ‘A Rights turn in 
Climate Change Litigation’ (2018) 7 TEL 37; Sophie Marjanac and Lindene Patton, ‘Extreme weather even 
attribution science and climate change litigation: an essential step in the causal chain?’ (2018) 3 JERL 1; 
Michal Nachmany, Sam Frankhauser, Joana Setzer, ‘Global trends in climate change legislation and 
litigation’ Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, May 2017.  
2 For different litigation avenues and in particular the link between safeguarding human rights and 
development to achieve climate justice, see the report of the International Bar Association ‘Achieving 
Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption’, available at { HYPERLINK 
"http://www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.aspx" }, page 3 and also 
chapter 3, last accessed 7 February 2019; Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer and Veerle Heyvaert, ‘If at 
First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change’ (2018) 38 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 841; Sabrina MacComrick, Rober L Glicksman, Samuel J Simmens, LeRoy Paddock, Daniel Kim, 
Brittany Whited, ‘Strategies in and outcomes of climate change litigation in the United States’ (2018) 8 
Nature Climate Change 829; Michael B Gerrard and Joseph A MacDougald, ‘An  Introduction to Climate 
Change Liability Litigation and a View to the Future’ (2013) 20 Connecticut Insurance Law Journal 153; 
Kim Bouwer, ‘The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation’, (2018) 30 JEL 1. 
3 The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation 200.178.245/01, 9 October 2018, 
ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610, (unofficial English translation), paras 3.8; 27. The Dutch text of the judgment 
is the only authentic and formal text (ECLI-number: ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2591). 
With its ruling, the Gerechtshof Den Haag (Hague Court of Appeal) confirmed the decision of 
the Rechtbank Den Haag of 24 June 2015 (Hague District Court).4   
In essence, the Hague Court of Appeal upheld the ruling that the State is under a ‘duty of care’ 
to limit the joint volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas emissions (GHG emissions or 
emissions) so that this volume will have reduced by at least 25% by the end of 2020 compared 
to the level of the year 1990.5 However, the Hague Court of Appeal based this decision on 
conceptually different reasoning from the Hague District Court in determining both the 
existence of that duty and the standard of care applicable.  
Before turning to that in detail, it is worth considering briefly how this judgment has been 
discussed so far. The immediate debate demonstrates two main strands of reaction. First, there 
is a general positive reception of the outcome of the case, shared by many.6 Secondly, opinions 
have differed particularly in relation to the competence of the judiciary under Dutch 
constitutional law but also under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)7 to issue 
such a ruling. It has been questioned whether the obligation to achieve a concrete minimum 
emission reduction target can be inferred from Article 2 or Article 8 ECHR. Concerns were 
raised that ordering a concrete target interferes with the margin of appreciation that the State 
                                                          
4 Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands (C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396, 24 June 2015, 
ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (unofficial English translation, only the Dutch text of the ruling is 
authoritative, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7145). For a discussion of the judgment see Roger Cox, ‘A climate 
change litigation precedent: Urgenda Foundation v The State of the Netherlands’ (2016) 34 JERL 143;  
Kars J de Graaf and Jan H Jans, ‘The Urgenda decision: Netherlands Liable for Role in Causing Dangerous 
Global Climate Change, (2015) 27 JEL 517; Suryapratim Roy and Edwin Woerdman, ‘Situating Urgenda v 
the Netherlands within comparative climate change litigation’ (2016) 34 JERL 165; Jolene Lin,’ The First 
Successful Climate Negligence Case: A Comment on Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the 
Netherlands’ (2015) 5 Climate Law 65; Eric Stein and Alex G Castermans, ‘Case Comment – Urgenda v 
The State of the Netherlands: The “Reflex Effect” – Climate Change, Human Rights, and the Expanding 
Definitions of the Duty of Care’ (2017) 13 McGill Journal of Sustainable Development Law 304. 
5 Hague District Court, para 5.1, confirmed by Hague Court of Appeal, para 76. 
6 Ingrid Leijten, ‘The Dutch Climate Case Judgment: Human Rights Potential and Constitutional Unease’ { 
HYPERLINK "http://leidenlawblog.nl/contributors/ingrid-leijten%3c" }; Jonathan Verschuuren, ‘Urgenda 
Climate Change Judgment survives Appeal in the Netherlands’ available at { HYPERLINK 
"https://blog.uvt.nl/environmentallaw/?p=354" } last accessed on 1 February 2019; Deepa 
Badrinarayana, ‘A constitutional Right to International Legal Representation: The Case of Climate 
Change’ (2018) 93 Tulane Law Review 47; see also 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/09/dutch-appeals-court-upholds-landmark-
climate-change-ruling. 
7 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, ETS no. 
5, 213 UNTS 221, I-2889, 47 Parties as of February 2019.  
has under Articles 2 and 8 ECHR.8 Closely related to that is the criticism that the Hague Court of 
Appeal acted outside its judicial powers, by intruding into the executive’s sphere of political 
decision-making.9  
This article proceeds in two main parts. The next part explains the ruling of the Hague Court of 
Appeal. This is followed by a second part, the analysis of the decision. The analysis makes three 
points.  
First, the ‘duty of care’ established in Urgenda accords with the ‘positive action doctrine’ of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and does not violate the State’s margin of 
appreciation or interfere with the separation of powers. Effective judicial review remains the 
ultimate marker to distinguish justiciable and non-justiciable policy issues in line with the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Reference to further case law will demonstrate that internationally, the 
Hague Court of Appeal is not the only court that is challenged to reconcile international human 
rights obligations and environmental commitments of States with the prevailing dependence of 
our economies on fossil fuel consumption.  
The second and third points of the analysis are closely related and demonstrate that the 
judgment can be interpreted as an answer to two fundamental questions: Should governments 
be held accountable in domestic courts for the achievement of short-term, mid-term and long-
term emission reduction goals?10 If that question is answered positively, at what point in time 
does this accountability occur?  
The conclusion draws the strings together and reflects briefly on how courts may contribute to 
‘good practice’ in enhancing the protection of human rights and the environment in line with 
the recommendations of the UN Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations 
relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean healthy and sustainable environment.  
                                                          
8 Ingrid Leijten (n 5). 
9 Johannes Fahner, ‘Climate Change before the Courts: Urgenda Ruling Redraws the Boundary between 
Law and Politics’ EJIL Talk, 16th November 2018, available at { HYPERLINK 
"http://www.ejiltalk.org/author/jfahner/" } last accessed on 1 February 2019.  
10 See for a discussion of the implications of new statutory duties in the UK Colin T Reid, ‘A New Sort of 
Duty? The Significance of “Outcome” Duties in the Climate Change and Child Poverty Acts’ (2012) 4 
Public Law 749. 
I. The decision of the Hague Court of Appeal 
1. The proceedings and the reasoning of the District Court in summary 
The State lodged its appeal on 23 September against the ruling of the Hague District Court.11 It 
submitted the entire dispute to the Gerechtshof Den Haag (Hague Court of Appeal), based on 
29 grounds. Urgenda contested the grounds of appeal and lodged a cross-appeal by submitting 
one ground of appeal, asserting that in contrast to the ruling of the Hague District Court it could 
rely on Articles 2 and 8 ECHR directly. Urgenda did not question the overall 25% target. In this 
situation, the Hague Court of Appeal re-assessed the dispute in its entirety, but decided that no 
more than a 25% reduction by 2020 could be awarded.  
The Hague Court of Appeal upheld the judgment of the District Court and declared its judgment 
provisionally enforceable.12 The State has lodged its appeal to the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden 
(Supreme Court of the Netherlands) within the two months deadline on 8th of January 2019.13  
The Hague District Court had ruled that the ECHR was not directly applicable in this case to 
establish a duty of care and that the internationally agreed climate objectives did not have a 
direct effect in Dutch law, but noted they were useful in defining ‘the framework for and the 
manner in which the State exercises its climate policy’.14 The Hague District Court based its 
reasoning on tort law and applied the concept of the State acting negligently towards the 
claimants in accordance with the hazardous negligence jurisprudence of the Dutch Supreme 
Court.15 By contrast, the Hague Court of Appeal used the ECHR as the direct basis for the 
existence of the duty of care, as will be explained further below. 
The violation of a ‘duty of care’ is a tortious act under Dutch law, and such duties can be 
derived from law or unwritten rules of social conduct.16 Just like the Hague District Court’s 
                                                          
11Kamerbrief over vonnis Urgenda/Staat available at 
www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2015/09/01/kabinetsreactie-vonnis-urgenda-staat-d-d-24-juni-jl 
12 On Friday, 16th of November 2018, the government announced its intention to appeal the judgment of 
the Hague Court of Appeal in which case the Supreme Court would decide. <{ HYPERLINK 
"https://www.urgenda.nl/en/dutch-government-fights-obligations-to-act-on-climate-change" }> 
(accessed 20/11/2018). 
13 Procesinleiding Vorderingsprocedure Hoge Raad (in Dutch only), 8 January 2019, available at { HYPERLINK 
"http://www.urgenda.nl/wp-content/uploads/20190108-procesinleiding-Staat-Urgenda-PRDF-2436693.pdf" } last 
accessed 14 January 2019. 
14 Hague District Court para 4.63. 
15 In the landmark Kelderluik decision, The Dutch Supreme Court developed four criteria that need to be 
considered in the evaluation of a dangerous situation , Hoge Raad 5 November 1965, 
ECLI:NL:HR:1965:AB7079, NJ 1966, 136; see Renée Huijsmans and Gerrit van Maanen (n 12) 388; 
Suryapratim Roy and Edwin Woerdman (n 4) 186. 
16 Book 6 Section 162(2) of the Dutch Civil Code prescribes: ‘As a tortious act is regarded a violation of 
someone else’s right (entitlement) and an act or omission in violation of a duty imposed by law or of 
judgment, the decision of the Hague Court of Appeal also rested on the underlying rationale 
that a breach of the duty of care would constitute a tortious act of the State under Dutch Civil 
law, Book 6 section 162(2).17 However, the reasoning behind the specific duty of care in this 
case was different in two main aspects. Firstly, the Hague Court of Appeal explained that 
Articles 2 and 8 ECHR are directly applicable in Dutch law. Secondly, to determine the concrete 
standard of the duty of care, the Court relied upon climate science and the internationally 
agreed temperature goal of limiting global warming to at least 2° C by the end of this century, in 
accordance with the IPCC reports and the global consensus as expressed in the Paris Agreement 
and the decisions of the Conference of Parties under the UNFCCC.18  
 
2. Starting point: the science on climate change 
In setting out the ‘factual framework’ established by the Hague District Court and not disputed 
by the parties,19 the Hague Court of Appeal explained how the consumption of energy and 
particularly fossil fuels since the Industrial Revolution has contributed to global warming. The 
Court recognized a linear relation of emissions and global warming in saying that ‘the 
greenhouse gas effect increases the more CO2 is emitted into the atmosphere’, resulting in 
increasing global warming.20 It pointed out that the full warming effect would only occur 30-40 
years after the emission took place and noted that the general consensus of climate research is 
                                                          
what according to unwritten law has to be regarded as proper social conduct, always as far as there was 
no justification for this behaviour’. See the Hague Court of Appeal, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196, 
Rechtbank Den Haag, at para. 4.46. for a discussion of Dutch tort law see Renée Huijsmans and Gerrit 
van Maanen, Supervisors' Liability: The Dutch Fireworks Case: A Comparative Study between the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Germany on State Liability in Case of Failure of Supervision’ 16 
Maastricht J. Eur. & Comp. L. 383, 386 (2009). 
17 Article 6:162 Definition of a ‘tortious act’ 
- 1. A person who commits a tortious act (unlawful act) against another person that can be attributed to 
him, must repair the damage that this other person has suffered as a result thereof.  
- 2. As a tortious act is regarded a violation of someone else’s right (entitlement) and an act or omission 
in violation of a duty imposed by law or of what according to unwritten law has to be regarded as proper 
social conduct, always as far as there was no justification for this behaviour. 
- 3. A tortious act can be attributed to the tortfeasor [the person committing the tortious act] if it results 
from his fault or from a cause for which he is accountable by virtue of law or generally accepted 
principles (common opinion). 
18 Court of Appeal para 43 and the following passage on ‘Dangerous climate change? Severity of the 
situation’. 
19 The Court explains however, that the Parties disagree in relation to the weighing of several of these 
facts and the conclusions that should be drawn from them. Court of Appeal para 2. 
20 Court of Appeal para 3.3. 
that the global temperature increase in the year 2100 should not exceed 2° C and that more 
recently the evidence had emerged that a safe temperature rise should not exceed 1.5° C.21 In 
response to the scientific knowledge, the global community had drawn up various treaties and 
agreements, in the UN, the EU and at State level, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions into the 
atmosphere. In addition to these mitigation measures, the Hague Court of Appeal recognised 
that adaptation measures were necessary to counter the consequences of severe climate 
change.22 Against this background, the Hague Court of Appeal detailed the reduction goals of 
the government of the Netherlands.23 The European Council had set the EU’s reduction target 
for 2050 at 80-95%. There were, however, two interim targets to achieve, 20% reduction by 
2020, and at least 40% in 2030. For the Netherlands, this entailed a reduction of 21% under the 
EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) sector by 2020 and 16% of the non-ETS sector.24 At the 
hearing in the first instance, it had become evident that the government was on track to 
achieve a reduction of only 14-17% by 2020 in both sectors; and that in in the year 2017 only a 
reduction of 13% had been accomplished.25 
 
3. International climate action and the history of Dutch reduction targets  
The Court then assessed the claim that the State’s emission reduction target should be higher 
against the background of the scientific evidence and of internationally agreed climate action. 
                                                          
21 Court of Appeal para 3.5; the judgment was released before the IPCC Special Report on the impacts of 
global warming of 1.5°C, where the IPCC outlined again the robust differences (robust means that at 
least two thirds of climate models show the same outcome) between risk scenarios between present-
day and global warming of 1.5°C, and between 1.5°C and 2° C warming towards the end of this century, 
see chapter 1, pages 18-23. <{ HYPERLINK "http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-
reports/sr15/sr15_chapter1.pdf" }> last accessed 1 February 2019. 
22 The Paris Agreement consists of three main action pillars, mitigation (Article 4), adaptation (Article 7) 
and compensation (Article 8), 1/CP.21, UN FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, UNTS chapter XXVII, 7.d, 
C.N.92.2016, 195 signatories and 184 Parties (29/11/2018), for the function of the Conference of Parties 
to provide guidance to implement these provision see Petra Minnerop, ‘Taking the Paris Agreement 
Forward: Continuous Strategic Decision-making on Climate Action by the Meeting of the Parties’ (2017) 
21 UNYB, 124, 129.  
23 Court of Appeal para 3.7. 
24 The EU ETS refers to the European market for emissions trading, which includes all 28 EU member 
States and Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. It covers approximately 45% of the EU’s internal 
greenhouse gas emissions and over 75% of international carbon trading, 
<https://ec.europa.eu/clima/sites/clima/files/factsheet_ets_en.pdf>  last accessed 1 February 2019. 
25 District Court para 4.26, see also the Centraal Bureau voor the Statistiek report for 2017, available at 
<https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2018/19/greenhouse-gas-emissions-slightly-down-in-2017>  last 
accessed 1 February 2019. 
Starting with the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including the 
decisions taken by the Conference of Parties (COP) thereunder26 and the assessment reports of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)27 and the UNEP Emissions Gap Reports 
2013 and 2017, the Paris Agreement and the EU’s framework of climate action were 
considered. The decisions of the Conference of Parties, the supreme decision-making body of 
the UNFCCC, have since 2007 stipulated a minimum reduction of 25-40% by Annex I countries 
in order stay below the 2° C warming limit. These decisions of the Conference of Parties had 
been adopted in close consideration of the IPCC’s AR 4 and AR5 which confirmed a higher 
minimum threshold for developed country parties despite their adaptation efforts and the 
potential of new technologies such as carbon extraction from the atmosphere. The Emissions 
Gap Report 2017 emphasises that even if States fully implemented their current pledges under 
the Paris Agreement, ‘80% of the carbon budget corresponding with the 2 C target will be used 
up by 2030. Starting from a 1.5°C target means that the carbon budget will be completely used 
up by then’.28 After explaining the obligation of all Parties to the Paris Agreement to draw up 
nationally determined contributions (NDCs) the Court took account of the fact that Parties had 
already expressed their grave concerns that the current NDCs were not sufficient to achieve the 
upper limit of the temperature target.29 
This was followed by an explanation of the situation in the Netherlands and its special role as 
an Annex I country under the UNFCCC. It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal stressed 
the fact that up until 2011, the agreed Dutch emission reduction target under the UNFCCC was 
30% by 2020. The Court specifically quoted a letter dated 12 October 2009, in which the 
Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment stated: ‘The total of emission 
reductions proposed by the developed countries so far is insufficient to achieve the 25-40% 
reduction in 2020, which is necessary to stay on a credible track to keep the 2° C objective 
                                                          
26 The Court particularly mentions the decisions of the Conference of Parties adopted in Kyoto in 1997 
(COP 3), Bali in 2007 (COP 13), Copenhagen in 2009 (COP 15), Cancun in 2010 (COP 16), Durban in 2011 
(COP 17), Doha in 2012 (COP 18), Warsaw in 2013 (COP 19), Paris in 2015 (COP 21), Marrakech in 2016 
(COP 22), Bonn in 2017 (COP 23), para 11. 
27 The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, set up in 1988 through UNEP and the World 
Meteorological Organisation, provides the international community with information on scientific 
research in relation to causes and solution pathways of climate change. 
28 Court of Appeal para 14, UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2017, page 33,Published by the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), November 2017 available at 
<wedocs.unep.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.11822/22070/EGR_2017.pdf>  last accessed 1 February 
2019. 
29 Hague Court of Appeal para 15. 
within reach.’ Only after that, from 2011 onwards, the Dutch reduction target was adjusted to 
the lower EU wide target of 20% for 2020.30 
In response to the Paris Agreement, the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
confirmed that more ambition and thus higher minimum thresholds as reduction targets were 
needed, and that in fact new IPCC guidelines had allowed the Netherlands to benefit from an 
upwardly adjusted emission baseline in 1990.31 As a result of these adjustments, the State was 
already close to a 25% reduction, however, given the bandwidths of 20-25%, there remained an 
unacceptable margin of uncertainty,32 especially in the light of the fact that CO2 equivalent 
emissions in 2017 dropped by only 1 % compared with 2016 and 17% compared to 1990.33 
4. Admissibility of the claim and Article 34 ECHR 
The Court started with the assessment of Urgenda’s ground for appeal in the cross-appeal, 
thereby dealing with the procedural issues raised by the State. 
The first question was whether Article 34 ECHR stood in the way of the Hague Court of Appeal 
hearing the claim. The Hague District Court had opined that Urgenda as legal person could not 
qualify as a ‘victim’ in accordance with Article 34 ECHR, and thus could not base its claim 
directly on an alleged violation of Articles 2 and 8 of the ECHR.34 The Court of Appeal ruled that 
Article 34 ECHR concerned only access to the ECtHR, and not to national courts.35 As such, it 
could not be invoked to prevent Urgenda relying on Articles 2 and 8 in the appeal 
proceedings.36 The Court explained that Article 34 evidently allowed claims for groups of 
individuals and non-governmental organisations, if they claim a violation of their rights. Even if 
the ECtHR, however, excludes ‘public interest action’,37 the Strasbourg court could not deny the 
                                                          
30 Hague Court of Appeal paras 19, 20. 
31 Hague Court of Appeal para 21. 
32 Hague Court of Appeal para 23. 
33 Centraal Bureau voor the Statistiek report for 2017, available at <www.cbs.nl/en-
gb/news/2018/19/greenhouse-gas-emissions-slightly-down-in-2017>  last accessed 1 February 2019. 
34 District Court para 4.45: ‘..the court considers that Urgenda itself cannot be designated as a direct or 
indirect victim, within the meaning of Article 34 ECHR, of a violation of Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. After all, 
unlike with a natural person, a legal person’s physical integrity cannot be violated nor can a legal 
person’s privacy be interfered with..’. 
35 Article 34 ECHR reads: ‘The Court may receive applications from any person, non-governmental 
organisation or groups of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the Higher 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the protocols thereto. The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right’. 
36 ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610, Gerechtshof Den Haag, 09.10.2018, at para 35. 
37 The ECtHR does not allow complaints in abstracto and does not provide for actio popularis claims 
alleging that a provision of domestic law or domestic practice contravenes the Convention. Moreover, 
access of claimants to Dutch courts. Book 3 section 305a of the Dutch Civil Code provides access 
to Dutch courts for class actions of interest groups.38 A group of individuals within the 
jurisdiction of the Netherlands can thus claim a violation of its rights under the ECHR.39 Since 
the Netherlands follows a strictly monist approach to International Law, the ECHR has direct 
effect in domestic law.40 
The Court further decided that it was not required to consider the ground of appeal, as raised 
by the State, that Urgenda’s claim was inadmissible in so far as it concerned the interest of 
future generations. It was sufficient that the admissibility of the claim raised in the interest of 
the present generation was undisputed.41 The Court also noted that Urgenda had sufficient 
interest in the claim. With that, the Court addressed the State’s argument that the proceedings 
might involve individuals who might not even want to be represented. However, this particular 
concern had been specifically acknowledged by the legislator, who in drafting the provision of 
Book 3 section 305a Dutch Civil Code made the decision that conflicting interests in society 
should not hinder the admissibility of a claim of one group of the society.42 
 
5. The existence and the standard of the duty of care 
The Hague Court of Appeal examined the asserted unlawfulness of the State’s current 
reduction target in relation to Book 6 Section 162 of the Dutch Civil Code and Articles 2 and 8 
ECHR. Starting points were Articles 2 and 8 ECHR, which have direct effect in Dutch law as 
mentioned above.43 The Court stated that both provisions apply in environment-related 
situations that affect or threaten to affect the right to life and the right to family life.44 
                                                          
claimants must be living persons and produce reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that 
a violation affecting them personally will occur, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin 
Campeanu v Romania, no 47848/08, ECHR 2014-V para 101. 
38 Court of Appeal para 36; Book 3 section 305a para. 1 reads: ‘A foundation or association with full legal 
capacity that, according to its articles of association, has the objections to protect specific interest, may 
bring to court a legal claim that intents to protect similar interests of other persons.’ 
39 This implies that the court qualifies (without explicitly saying so), that Urgenda qualifies as a 
foundation or association that has full legal capacity and aims at protecting specific interest. 
40 This strict monist approach entails that rights provision are directly applicable in domestic courts. The 
benefit of this approach for human rights protection was already noted in 1950, see Hersch Lauterpacht, 
International Law and Human Rights (London 1950), 70. 
41 Hague Court of Appeal para 37. 
42 Hague Court of Appeal para 38, referring to Parliamentary Papers II, 1991/92, 22 486, no. 3, p. 22. 
43 Hague Court of Appeal para 36. 
44 Hague Court of Appeal para 40. 
These provisions formed the basis for the government’s duty of care: ‘the government has both 
positive and negative obligations relating to the interests protected by these articles, including 
the positive obligations to take concrete actions to prevent a future violation of these interests 
(in short: a duty of care).’45 The Court explained that the duty of care required that preventive 
action be taken if an interest that is protected is in danger of being affected, as a result of an 
act, activity or natural event. For interests that are solely protected under Article 8, the court 
referenced the case law of the ECtHR to underline that potential threats must exceed a 
minimum level of severity.46 In considering the approach of the ECtHR in relation to the margin 
of appreciation that governments have, the Court of Appeal established that the duty of care 
should not place a disproportionate burden on the government.47  The Court concluded at that 
point that the State had a ‘positive obligation to protect the lives of citizens within its 
jurisdiction under Article 2 ECHR, while Article 8 ECHR created the obligation to protect the 
right to home and private life. This applied to all activities, public and private, which could 
endanger the rights protected in these articles, and certainly in the face of industrial activities 
which by their very nature are dangerous’.48 
In a next step, the Court had to establish that a real imminent threat existed and this had to be 
followed by a definition of the concrete standard against which the actions of the State would 
be measured in order to determine compliance with its duty of care. 
The Court stated that there existed a direct, linear link between anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases and global warming and noted that the full extent of the warming effect 
takes place with a 30-40 years delay after the time of emission. Global warming increases the 
severity of adverse climate impacts. Furthermore, the Court explicitly referred to the IPCC’s AR5 
in recognising the risk of reaching a tipping point, which may result in abrupt climate change.49 
This risk increased with a temperature rise of between 1 and 2° C. That a ‘safe’ temperature rise 
should not exceed 1.5°C was not disputed by the Parties. However, the emissions of CO2 in the 
Netherlands remained high, according to the Court, with CO2 still contributing 85% of all the 
country’s greenhouse gas emissions. The Court concluded that this amounted to ‘a real threat 
of dangerous climate change, resulting in the serious risk that the current generation of citizens 
will be confronted with loss of life and/or a disruption of family life’.50 
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The Court then assessed whether the State was acting unlawfully by not reducing emissions 
further despite the real and imminent threats. To answer this, the court had to determine the 
standard that the ‘duty of care’ requires from the State, in other words, the concrete reduction 
target that the State should aim for.  
The Court stated that in 2017, Dutch emissions had dropped by only 13%. Thus, in order to 
reach the target of 49% in 2030, a much greater effort would need to be made by the 
Netherlands than undertaken so far. The Court stressed the fact that greenhouse gas emissions 
linger in the atmosphere for a very long time and further contribute to global warming. This 
demonstrated that the State should achieve a higher reduction target already by 2020 to 
ensure an even distribution of reduction efforts. The Court substantiated this with the 
reference to the UNEP Emissions Gap Report 2013 and the report of the Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL) of 9 October 2017.51 If reductions were evenly 
distributed until 2050, with the aim to achieve at that point a reduction of 95%, this would 
entail a 28% reduction target in the short-term. This was confirmed by the government in 
answering the Court’s questions.52  
The Court then turned to the IPCC assessment reports AR4 and AR5 and concluded that an 
emission reduction of 25-40% in 2020 was required in these reports to meet the 2° C target.53 
The Court acknowledged that according to the AR5 multiple mitigation pathways existed, 
however, in accordance with the European Academy Science Advisory Council, it did not 
support (in the absence of further evidence) the State’s argument that technologies such as 
carbon extraction from the atmosphere would in fact contribute substantively to achieving the 
2° C target.54  
The Court was satisfied that the State had known about the fact that a reduction target of 25%-
40% by the end of 2020 would be necessary to achieve the 2° C target. The evidence for this 
had already been provided in the 4th Assessment Report of the IPCC in 2007. It is interesting 
that the Court in this context also refers to the decisions of Parties under the UNFCCC. Even 
though these decisions would not amount to a legally binding standard, they still confirmed 
that 25-40% reductions were necessary to prevent dangerous climate change. This was further 
underlined by the fact that the Netherlands had initially adopted a target of 30% reduction, 
based on the conviction that this had been the necessary benchmark to keep within the 2° C 
limit. The Court concluded that a reduction obligation of at least 25% by end 2020 was required 
to comply with the State’s duty of care.  
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At this point, then, the Court had come to two conclusions. Articles 2 and 8 ECHR were directly 
applicable in Dutch law and a duty of care followed from these provisions. The court 
determined the concrete standard for this duty of care on the basis of the available scientific 
evidence, and the internationally agreed temperature goal of the Paris Agreement.  
6.   The State’s defences 
The Court then turned to the State’s defences. None of these were accepted by the Court. In 
particularly the argument that the State’s participation in the EU ETS could stand in the way of 
adopting more stringent targets was not accepted. This is not surprising given the fact that 
Article 193 TFEU when read on its face explicitly allows greater ambition of EU Member 
States.55 The argument that under the EU ETS a ‘waterbed effect’56 would occur did not 
convince the Court either. The waterbed effect means that the emission reduction achieved in 
the Netherlands will at the same time be consumed by surplus emissions in other EU Member 
States. The Court reasoned that it could not be presumed that other Member States would take 
less far-reaching measures than the Netherlands, especially since the Court was convinced on 
the basis of the evidence that the Netherlands was ‘lagging behind’.57 The risk of ‘carbon 
leakage’ as argued by the State was not recognised by the Court. ‘Carbon leakage’ refers to the 
potential loss of investment because companies could prefer to relocate to States with less 
strict emission obligations. The Court decided that this claim was not sufficiently 
substantiated,58 especially since the same argument did not seem to prevent the State to 
commit for 2030 to a target of 49%, higher than the EU’s target.59 
The Court refused the argument that adaptation measures of the State would relieve the State 
of its obligation to reduce CO2 emission ‘quicker than it has planned.’60 
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The Court explained that the reduction requirement of 25-40 % that the Netherlands had to 
achieve under the UNFCCC as an Annex I country would apply to it individually, especially since 
the Netherlands had one of the highest per capita GDP of the Annex I countries.61 
Concerning the claim that the Netherlands could not, on its own, solve the problem of global 
greenhouse gas emissions, the Court explicitly stated that ‘this does not release the State from 
its obligation to take measures in its territory, within its capabilities, which in concert with the 
efforts of other states provide protection from the hazards of dangerous climate change’.62 In 
relation to the defence that there was a lack of a causal link, the Court held that because the 
case did not concern a claim for damages, ‘causality only plays a limited role’.63 Furthermore, 
the fact that other countries also contributed to climate change did not lead to failure of the 
claim for lack of causation, because this would deny claimants an effective legal remedy in a 
situation that involved a global problem.64 The court supported this by a practical consideration 
which also demonstrated a good sense of humour, in adding that ‘Urgenda does not have the 
option to summon all eligible states to appear in a Dutch court’.65 In relation to the alleged 
shortage of time to achieve a higher reduction in emissions, the Court opined that the Hague 
District Court’s ruling was now over three years old and also that the State had known for a 
long time about the severity of the situation and had even focused on a 30% reduction target 
by 2020 up until 2011. In addition to that, the Court in this context remarked that the 
Netherlands with relatively high per capita greenhouse gas emissions ‘should assume its 
responsibility’.66  
The Court rejected further the claim that a court order would conflict with the separation of 
powers and the role of courts in the constitution of the Netherlands. The Court held that it was 
‘obliged to apply provisions with direct effect of treaties to which the Netherlands is party, 
including Articles 2 and 8 ECHR’.67 Moreover, the State still had discretion as to how to achieve 
the further reduction.  
7. The conclusion of the Court of Appeal 
This assessment of the Court is followed by a conclusion, in which the Court stated that the 
State ‘fails to fulfil its duty of care pursuant to Articles 2 and 8 ECHR by not wanting to reduce 
emissions by at least 25% by end 2020.’ This reduction should be considered a minimum, 
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according to the Court, which also meant that the current margin of uncertainty of 19-27% was 
unacceptable when facing such serious consequences as identified by the Court.68 
 
II. Human Rights, climate protection and the ‘duty of care’ 
 
1. Interpretation of Article 2 and Article 8 ECHR in Climate Change law 
Did the Court of Appeal go too far and interpret the rights of the ECHR in a more generous way 
than the ECtHR, thereby delivering a ruling that is unconvincing and perhaps even susceptible 
to being overturned by the Supreme Court of the Netherlands?69 This question is indeed 
fundamental for the persuasiveness of the judgment and deserves closer examination.  
The ECtHR in Strasbourg characterises the ECHR as a living instrument capable of adapting to 
new standards and particularly to an evolving European consensus that may advance the scope 
of the Convention.70 The ECHR has also been qualified as a constitutional instrument for the 
harmonisation of human rights standards in Europe.71  
In contrast to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights72 or the Additional Protocol to 
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Protocol of San Salvador),73 the ECHR does not provide for a right to a healthy environment. 
Nevertheless, the ECtHR has acknowledged in its jurisprudence that the existing rights under 
the ECHR, in particular Articles 2 and 8, may serve to protect the environment indirectly.74 
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Indeed, a ‘greening’ of existing human rights under the ECHR, and the effectiveness of this 
approach can be juxtaposed with the protection of the environment through explicit provisions 
in other regional and national human rights instruments.75  
Before addressing the criticism mentioned in the Introduction and thereby turning to the 
question of the ECtHR’s interpretation of Articles 2 and 8 in more detail, a further critique of 
the judgment should be considered briefly. This concerns the argument that the Court 
insufficiently differentiated between the two human rights provisions. Admittedly, the Court 
does not delve into too much detail at this point. However, the legal question before the Court 
was first and foremost whether the State is under a duty of care that obliges the State to adopt 
certain measures. Consequently, after stating that the right to life and the right to family life are 
at stake as a consequence of the severe risk posed by climate change, a further differentiation 
was not required to establish that the duty of care as such existed. It also worth noting that the 
ECtHR itself has decided, in cases where a positive obligation to safeguard the right to life 
exists, it is then not necessary to examine the complaint and the same facts under Article 8 
separately.76 
In returning to the interpretation of these rights provisions by the ECtHR, it should be 
remembered that as detailed above, the Hague Court of Appeal’s decision can be interpreted as 
an assessment of two different issues in the context of Article 2 and 8 ECHR. First, the existence 
of a duty of care, which is based on both human rights provisions as directly applicable law. 
Here it becomes relevant whether the Court rightly assumed that Articles 2 and 8 demand 
preventive State action in the given context of climate change. Thus, only in identifying the 
existence of a duty of care can the question arise whether the Court’s reasoning is in line with 
the interpretation of the substantive scope of Articles 2 and 8 by the ECtHR. For the definition 
of the concrete content of this duty of care, that is the standard against which compliance of 
the State is to be measured, the Court turns to a risk assessment in accordance with climate 
science and then examines reduction scenarios that would give effect to or impede the global 
temperature goal. The Court’s reasoning in relation to the standard of the duty of care rests on 
the ‘general consensus in the climate science community’ that the global temperature should 
not exceed 2° C and that new insights over the past few years indicate that a safe temperature 
rise should not exceed 1.5° C.77  
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In line with this reading of the judgment, any critique of the Hague Court of Appeal 
overstepping the line of interpretation of Articles 2 and 8 by the ECtHR must be narrowed down 
to the following question. Has the Court, in finding a legal basis in Articles 2 and 8 for the 
existence of a duty of care in a climate change case, overstepped the boundaries of the ECtHR’s 
environmental case law?  
 A closer examination of the case law does not support that the Urgenda appeal decision is 
incompatible with the case law of the ECtHR, despite the fact that the ECtHR itself has not yet 
heard a climate case. The jurisprudence of the ECtHR under Article 2 rests on two main pillars, 
the first being the prohibition on States against intentionally and unlawfully take life.78  
What matters more in the present scenario is the second pillar, the ‘doctrine of positive 
obligations’ of States to actively protect and safeguard the lives of persons under their 
jurisdiction.79 At the same time, any State Party to the ECHR has a margin of appreciation in 
complying with its protective duties. The ECtHR acknowledges that national authorities are 
responsible for priority choices and allocating of resources, especially concerning complex 
issues of environmental and economic policies.80 It follows that an obligation under Article 2 
must not be interpreted so as to impose an impossible or disproportionate burden on the 
authorities.81 Thus, the positive obligation of the State requires and allows the State to exercise 
its margin of appreciation so as to strike a fair balance between affected interests, be it other 
individuals or the economic wellbeing of the State.82 
Two issues arise in this context. First, how does the ECtHR define the material scope of Article 2 
and Article 8 as a basis for such a positive obligation, especially in environmental contexts? 
Secondly, how does the ECtHR apply the wide margin of appreciation that the State has, to 
adopt policy and legislative measures in complex environmental matters? Each of these issues 
will be addressed in turn. 
A close examination of the scope of Articles 2 and 8 as interpreted by the ECtHR supports the 
reading that the State is under a positive obligation to adopt preventive measures to avert the 
risk of climate change. In defining and interpreting the positive obligations flowing from Article 
2 ECHR, the ECtHR emphasised already in Osman v the United Kingdom, that a duty to protect 
the right to life can only exist if it is established that ‘the authorities knew or ought to have 
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified 
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individual or individuals’.83  This failure to perceive a risk to life must not be tantamount to 
gross negligence or wilful disregard of the duty to protect.84 A violation of Article 2 can occur 
below the negligence threshold.85 In a situation where the risk has not yet materialised, there 
must be, from a perspective ex ante, a real and imminent risk to life that the State knew or 
ought to have known.86  
The substantive limb of the scope of Article 2 is complemented by a procedural limb. This 
includes for instance the obligation of States to investigate deaths that may have occurred in 
breach of the Convention.87  States are under the obligation to effectively implement domestic 
laws which protect the right to life and to ensure the accountability of State authorities for 
deaths occurring under their responsibility.88 The procedural limb also comprises the provision 
of information to the public on prevailing risks and the maintenance of a legislative and 
administrative framework designed to provide effective deterrence against threats to the right 
to life.89  
The Court has held consistently that with regard to dangerous industrial activities in an 
environmental context, special emphasis must be placed on the domestic regulation of the 
activity in question. This refers to the level of potential risk it entails, which must be governed 
by rules on licensing, installing, operating and supervising the activity. The State must also make 
it compulsory for all those concerned to take preventive measures to safeguard the lives of 
those who are endangered by the inherent risk.90 In Öneryıldız v Turkey the Court specifically 
reasoned that among these measures, a special emphasis should be placed on the right to 
information, and underlined that this interpretation was supported by current developments in 
European standards.91 The Court in Öneryıldız found a violation of Article 2 under the 
substantive and the procedural limb. Substantively, this was because after an expert report had 
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identified a risk of methane explosion for inhabitants who had illegally built their dwellings on a 
municipal rubbish tip, authorities knew or ought to have known that there was a real and 
immediate risk to life and thus, the State was obliged to take preventive operational measures 
to avert the risk materialising.92 A violation of the procedural limb occurred because the 
operation of the justice system failed to secure the full accountability of authorities and thus 
did not provide adequate protection by law to safeguarding the right to life.93  
The Court confirmed in Budayeva and Others v. Russia that positive obligations under Article 2 
exist even in cases beyond human control, such as in the event of a natural disaster, where the 
State must provide the necessary legislative and administrative framework to maintain 
adequate defence and warning infrastructure.94  
The scope of the right to family life in Article 8 has been defined broadly by the ECtHR.95 Just as 
with the right to life, the right to family life contains negative and positive obligations. The 
scope of the right includes the quiet enjoyment of the home as a physical area. Not only does 
unauthorised entry into a person’s home constitute a breach, but also interferences by noise, 
emissions, smells or similar forms of disruption.96  
As to the negative obligation, the State must refrain from any arbitrary interference with 
private and family life. The positive obligation of a State is to ensure that the rights under 
Article 8 are respected and protected, by adopting legislative and regulatory frameworks to 
safeguard the right. This obligation includes the relationship between private individuals, the 
State must ensure that other private individuals cannot infringe a person’s right.97 The Court 
reasoned in Lopez Ostra v Spain that ‘severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ 
well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private 
and family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health.’98 The fact that 
Article 8 does not comprise a general right to nature preservation as such was again confirmed 
                                                          
92 Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. { HYPERLINK "https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng" \l 
"{%22appno%22:[%2248939/99%22]}" \t "_blank" }, ECHR 2004-XII paras. 109, 110. 
93 Öneryıldız v. Turkey [GC], no. { HYPERLINK "https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng" \l 
"{%22appno%22:[%2248939/99%22]}" \t "_blank" }, ECHR 2004-XII paras. 117, 118. 
94 Budayeva and Others v Russia, no 15339/02, ECHR 2008-II paras 129, 132. 
95 Guide on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights Right to respect for private and 
family life, home and correspondence, at 7. 
96 Hatton and Others v The United Kingdom [GC] no 36022/97 ECHR 2003-VIII para 96; Deés v. Hungary, 
no 2345/06 (ECtHR, 9 November 2010) para § 21; Moreno Gómez v. Spain, no 4143/02, ECHR 2004-X 
para 53. 
97 Evans v the United Kingdom,[GC] no 6339/05, ECHR 2007-I para 75. 
98 López Ostra v Spain no 16798/90, A/303-C, [1994] para 51. 
in Fadeyeva v Russia.99 The scope of Article 8 can only be affected if the environmental 
pollution manifests itself in an interference with the ‘private sphere’ 100 even if that does not 
pose a serious health threat.101 The ECtHR further requires that a causal link must exist 
between the environmental pollution and the negative impact on the private or family life. 
These adverse effects must also attain a certain minimum level. The assessment of this level is 
relative and depends on all circumstances of the case, including intensity and duration of the 
nuisance and its mental or physical effects on individuals.102  
Admittedly, the ECtHR so far has not subsumed climate change as a risk within Articles 2 and 8. 
To establish the positive obligation in accordance with the case law of the ECtHR, the risk must 
be such that the protected rights are at stake. Climate change is a common concern of 
humankind103 and global warming beyond the temperature goal of the Paris Agreement poses a 
severe risk to humans according to scientific evidence.104 These risks affect the right to family 
life, as severe weather events pose an immediate threat to many aspects of family and private 
life, in the form of heat waves, rising sea levels, increased flood risk and food shortages. The 
State must also have known of the risks of climate change, a matter that was not disputed in 
Urgenda. Thus, the risks of climate change are arguably within the scope of Article 2 and Article 
8 and both provisions demand positive action by the State to minimise the risk of violation. The 
Hague Court of Appeal has translated these positive obligations that arise under the ECHR into 
the duty of care of the State.   
The second and more complicated issue is, however, whether the Hague Court of Appeal 
thereby applied a narrower margin of appreciation than the ECtHR itself would have granted in 
                                                          
99 Fadeyeva v. Russia no. { HYPERLINK "https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng" \l 
"{%22appno%22:[%2255723/00%22]}" \t "_blank" }, ECHR 2005-IV para 68; see also Kyrtatos v. Greece, 
no 41666/98, ECHR 2003-VI para 52; Dubetska and Others v. Ukraine, no 30499/03 (ECtHR, 10 February 
2011) para 105. 
100 Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. { HYPERLINK "https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng" \l 
"{%22appno%22:[%2255723/00%22]}" \t "_blank" }, ECHR 2005-IV para 68, 
101 Taşkın and Others v. Turkey, no 46117/99, ECHR 2004-X para 113.  
102 Fadeyeva v. Russia, no. 55723/00, ECHR 2005 IV para 69; Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom 
[GC] no 36022/97 ECHR 2003-VIII para 96: ‘..seriously affected by noise or pollution..’. 
103 Preamble of the Paris Agreement, see above n21. 
104 Allen, M.R., O.P. Dube, W. Solecki, F. Aragón-Durand, W. Cramer, S. Humphreys, M. Kainuma, J. Kala, 
N. Mahowald, Y. Mulugetta, R. Perez, M.Wairiu, and K. Zickfeld, 2018: Framing and Context. In: Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. An IPCC Special Report on the impacts of global warming of 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels and related global greenhouse gas emission pathways, in the context of strengthening the global 
response to the threat of climate change, sustainable development, and efforts to eradicate poverty 
[Masson-Delmotte, V., P. Zhai, H.-O. Pörtner, D. Roberts, J. Skea, P.R. Shukla, A. Pirani, W. Moufouma-
Okia, C. Péan, R. Pidcock, S. Connors, J.B.R. Matthews, Y. Chen, X. Zhou, M.I. Gomis, E. Lonnoy, T. 
Maycock, M. Tignor, and T. Waterfield (eds.)]. In Press, chapter 1, 69. 
relation to the State. The next section examines how the ECtHR balances the margin of 
appreciation with the obligation of States to comply with their positive obligations under Article 
2 and 8 in environmental cases. It should be made clear at the outset that when national courts 
apply the Convention, they take account of the ECtHR’s case law, and this includes 
interpretative tools such as the doctrine of the margin of appreciation, as the Hague Court of 
Appeal confirmed.105 At the same time, the ECtHR acknowledges that national courts may 
define the scope of review in line with their own public-law concepts, ‘such as irrationality, 
unlawfulness and patent unreasonableness’.106 However, if an applicant has an arguable claim 
of a rights violation under the ECHR, the domestic regime must afford an effective remedy in 
accordance with Article 13 ECHR.107 The objective of Article 13 ECHR is to enable individuals to 
obtain appropriate relief at national level ‘before having to set in motion the international 
machinery of complaint before the Court’.108 That means that the margin of appreciation at the 
domestic level is limited with a view to this provision. Accordingly, the ECtHR has not accepted 
the argument that the (wide) margin of appreciation that it accords the State could be used by 
a government to claim that a domestic court in reviewing the government’s action acted 
unlawfully.109  
How exactly is the margin of appreciation of States reconciled with the judicial powers of the 
ECtHR? First of all, the ECtHR draws no conceptual distinction in relation to the margin of 
appreciation it allows, whether an applicant claims that an interference with a right exists, or 
whether a standard for a positive obligation is at stake. It reasons that in both scenarios the 
State must strike a balance between competing interests.110  
Indicative of a State’s failure to strike such a balance in the environmental case law is a 
situation in which national authorities fail to comply with their own domestic regime.111 One 
could perhaps argue that downgrading the national reduction targets amounts to a failure to 
comply with the domestic regime. The obvious argument against this would be that adopting a 
new target is not non-compliance with an existing regime but a change of the regime. Indeed, 
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the present case is different from, for example, the operation of an illegal waste treatment 
plant as in Lopez.  
However, even in the absence of domestic irregularities as indicative factors, the ECtHR 
redefines and narrows the margin of appreciation in other cases, either because of the nature 
of the activity the State regulates, or the aims of the restriction. To illustrate this, if a case 
concerns a most intimate aspect of private life, such as sexual conduct, particularly serious 
reasons must exist before interferences by public authorities can be legitimate.112  
A further factor that may narrow down the margin of appreciation is if a new ‘European 
Consensus’ emerges, that indicates that Parties to the ECHR adopt a common standard that 
advances the interpretation of the ECHR.113 The ECtHR uses this concept in relation to the 
margin of appreciation114 and adopts a comparative-analytical approach to establish the 
common ground or standard in the law and practice of the Parties to the Convention.115 In the 
present scenario, an argument would need to be made for the fact that there is a growing 
European Consensus. 
The most convincing argument against proceeding with the analysis on the basis of a narrower 
margin of appreciation as a result of an indicative factor or an emerging European Consensus is 
that an answer to the question whether the balance has been struck is even more convincing in 
the absence of any such initial assumption. Just like in Hatton, the question at this point thus 
reverts back to the ordinary margin of appreciation that is available to States in taking policy 
decisions in environmental contexts.116   
It is argued here that the Hague Court of Appeal has not interfered with this margin, for the 
following reasons. The Hague Court used environmental standards, internationally and 
domestically endorsed, to exemplify what is the necessary minimum threshold to mitigate 
climate change that allows the prevention of scientifically proven risks which are not limited to, 
but will affect, the personal and substantive scope of Article 2 and Article 8 protected rights.117 
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The extent will depend on whether or not the long-term temperature goal of the Paris 
Agreement is achieved, with new evidence emerging that a temperature increase of 1.5°C 
would considerably reduce risks of extreme weather events compared to 2° C global 
warming.118 On that basis, the Court sets a threshold below which the State is failing in its duty. 
This minimum threshold for the State’s 2020 emission reduction target forms part of the ‘what’ 
that the State has to do and should not be re-interpreted as a concrete course of action in the 
sense of ‘how’ the State has to achieve these reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. How to 
achieve the further reductions remains within the discretion of the State. Conversely, the 
minimum threshold of 25% represents an essential part that qualifies the positive obligation of 
the State. It is not the fact that the State is emitting CO2 that amounts to a violation of Article 2 
and 8, but that the State is emitting above a certain benchmark. The question for the Court was 
to establish how much the State could emit without violating human rights and this cannot not 
be answered without stipulating a concrete minimum target. Ordering this concrete benchmark 
in the area of climate change is similar to the requirement of providing an effective legislative 
framework in the area of natural disaster management and the control of hazardous activities; 
to afford a national warning mechanism or an effective system to enquire into the 
accountability of authorities in the event a known risk has materialised and could have been 
prevented as in Öneryıldız. Moreover, the Hague Court of Appeal has applied a scope of review 
that eludes the risk of breaching the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the ECHR 
as in Hatton.119 In that case, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR overturned the decision of the 
Chamber of the Court because it could not find a violation of the substantive scope of Article 
8.120 However, the ECtHR found that the domestic remedy had not been effective, because the 
national court had defined the matter of policy issues too broadly and failed to afford claimants 
effective judicial review. The right to provide effective access to a judicial remedy thus marks 
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the ultimate line for the separation of powers. Judicial self-restrained that defines the 
prerogative of the executive too broadly and declines to scrutinise policy decisions as such or 
even only because of their complexity, may risk violating the right to an effective remedy under 
Article 13 of the ECHR.   
2. Is there potential for Consensus? References to some global climate cases 
Are other cases indicating that European States have a similar approach to enforcing climate 
action of their governments, pointing perhaps to an evolving European Consensus in that 
respect? Would that consensus require adopting quantified emission reduction targets, or also 
stipulate operational enforcement procedures in domestic law? Answering these questions 
would go beyond the purpose of this article. Urgenda is to date the high watermark for the 
European case law, as mentioned in the introduction. The following will only give a short survey 
of the gist of a wider judicial enquiry into climate action of States based on human rights 
protection. So far, the decided cases tentatively allow a preliminary presumption to be drawn, 
that a mixed picture emerges in Europe; one which does not indicate the potential outcome of 
pending cases. These pending cases could of course shift the evidence to either side. 
Interestingly, there are a successful and pending human rights based climate lawsuits outside 
Europe which will also be referenced briefly, clearly not to proof or disproof a specific European 
Consensus but because they illustrate the scope of judicial responses globally which treat 
climate change as a human rights concern.  
The virtue of human rights in climate change litigation is that they provide a cause of action 
against governments. Yet in a field of complex economic and environmental decision-making, 
courts may dismiss a lawsuit on the ground that it raises a non-justiciable political question. 
In Greenpeace Nordic and Nature Youth v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy the Oslo District 
Court ruled in January 2018 that a the licencing decision of the government did not violate 
Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution.121 The court explained that in order for the licensing 
decision to amount to a violation of Article 112, a relationship between the decision and the 
undesirable environmental impacts needed to be determined. In further specifying the 
environmental damage that might occur, the Court then opined that CO emissions abroad from 
exported oil and gas have no significance in the assessment of whether there is a violation of 
Article 112 of the Norwegian Constitution. This allowed the Court to conclude that the 
remaining environmental risk, consisting of the risk entailed in the drilling operation itself and 
Norwegian GHG emissions, was rather limited. In the light of this limited risk, the Court found 
that the Government has fulfilled its procedural duties under the Constitution. Greenpeace 
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Nordic and Nature and Youth are appealing the decision of the District Court to the Norwegian 
Supreme Court.122 
In Plan B Earth v Secretary of State in the UK, the UK High Court of Justice in July 2018 rejected 
the submission that it could be argued that the Secretary of State violated Articles 2 and 8 ECHR 
by not further tightening the emission reduction target of the Climate Change Act 2008.123 In 
November 2018, the Swiss Federal Administrative Court dismissed a claim of the Climate 
Seniors Association and ruled that the government’s climate change mitigation measures did 
not affect the association in any particular way beyond the impact on the general public and 
that a claim for the release of a court order could not be based on the ECHR.124    
Pending cases demonstrate that litigation strategies are constantly evolving. Claimants in the 
case VZW Klimatzaak v. Kingdom of Belgium follow the human rights approach of Urgenda. The 
claim is brought against four Belgian regions and respective language issues were resolved by 
the Court de Cassation in April 2018.125 Reference to Urgenda was also made recently by 
Greenpeace Germany and three German families whose livelihoods rely on organic farming 
before the Administrative Court in Berlin in a lawsuit against the German federal government. 
They assert that in accordance with the Special IPCC Report on Global Warming which was 
released in October 2018, it has become clear that global emissions must be reduced long 
before 2030 and at a higher reduction rate than previously assumed. The claimants rely on their 
rights under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and on the application of the rights under the 
ECHR, which is applicable as federal law (not constitutional law) in Germany.126  
Human rights and environmental standards may even merge at the domestic level into a new 
implied constitutional right to a healthy environment. The ruling of the High Court of Ireland in 
the case of the Friends of the Irish Environment v Fingal County Council gives an example of how 
increasing awareness for environmental protection led to the explicit recognition of an implied 
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constitutional right.127 Claimants aimed at overturning the planning permission for a new 
runway at Dublin Airport. This was not granted yet the Court stated: ‘A right to an environment 
that is consistent with the human dignity and well-being of citizens at large is an essential 
condition for the fulfilment of all human rights. It is an indispensable existential right that is 
enjoyed universally, yet which is vested personally as a right that presents and can be seen 
always to have presented, and to enjoy protection, under Art. 40.3.1° of the Constitution’.128 
This case was similar to a lawsuit concerning the permission to build a third runway at the 
Vienna Airport which was also eventually lost in the Austrian Constitutional Court when the 
decision of the Federal Administrative Court was reversed. 129 In the Climate case Ireland which 
was launched in the aftermath of the Dublin Airport decision, The Friends of the Irish 
Environment obtained from the High Court leave to judicially review the Irish government’s 
approval of its 2017 National Climate Mitigation Plan.130 
A constitutional complaint to the German Federal Constitutional Court was lodged in November 
2018 by a solar energy promotion association Germany (SFV) and the federation for 
environment and nature protection Germany (BUND). They argue that to protect the 
fundamental rights to life, health and property under the German Basic Law, the Federal 
Government and the Bundestag must systematically combat global warming, at a minimum, 
meeting the global warming limit of 1.5°C of the Paris Agreement.131 
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In December 2018, four non-governmental organisations in France sent a formal letter to the 
French Prime Minister and 12 members of the French government, to start legal proceedings 
for an action for failure to act against the French government.132  
The European Union and its climate action has also been challenged recently. In 2018, the case 
Carvalho and Other v Parliament and Council of the European Union was brought to the General 
Court of the European Union.133 The claimants assert that the European Union is obliged to 
adapt more stringent GHG emission reduction targets than it currently has. The existing target 
of a 40% reduction of GHG emissions by 2030 set in the current legislative measures134 
threatens, it is argued, the fundamental rights of life, health, occupation and property as 
protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. 
In the United States, the landmark case of Juliana v United States was filed in the U.S. District 
Court for Oregon in 2015 and has not yet been able to move to trial.135 While the US 
government had failed with various attempts to prevent the case from going to trial, each time 
causing further delays, the expectation was that following the Supreme Court ruling of 30 July 
2018, the facts of the case would be heard on 29 of October 2018. However, the Oregon 
Federal District Court stayed proceedings of the young plaintiffs on the 21 November 2018, to 
allow the government to pursue interlocutory appeal.136 On 26 December 2018, the 9th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeal granted the government the permission to appeal the decision of the 
District Court allowing the case to move to trial.137 In January 2019, the plaintiffs filed a motion 
to expedite the appeal and to set a schedule for the briefing and the oral argument138, this was 
granted in part by the 9th Circuit Court.139 In February 2019, the government filed its opening 
brief arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing and that the lawsuit would not be a controversy 
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within the meaning of Article III of the constitution. Furthermore, even if there existed a federal 
public trust doctrine, this would not cover the ‘climate system’ or atmosphere.140 
Other courts have even recognised that the environment itself may qualify as a rights subject. 
The Supreme Court of Justice in Colombia decided on the tutela141 of young plaintiffs in 2018 
that the Colombian State had not effectively protected the Colombian Amazon from 
deforestation and thereby infringed the rights of present and future generations to life and a 
healthy environment. The Supreme Court even recognised the Colombian Amazon as an entity 
capable of being a subject of rights. That an ecosystem can be such an entity with rights of its 
own had already been decided in 2017. The Colombian Constitutional Court ruled that the 
Atrato River deserved protection qua its own rights. The Supreme Courte ordered the 
Presidency and the Ministries of Environment and Agriculture to create an 'intergenerational 
pact’ for the life of the Colombian Amazon, in which the plaintiffs and affected community 
should participate actively.142  
Already in 2005, the Federal High Court of Nigeria found that activities related to exploring and 
producing Crude Oil and other Petroleum Products can violate fundamental and human rights. 
The Court decided that the fundamental rights to life and dignity of human persons provided in 
section 33 (1) and 34 (1) of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, and reinforced by 
Articles 4, 16 and 24 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, included the right to 
a clean, poison-free, pollution-free and healthy environment.143 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights gave an advisory opinion in 2017 in response to a 
request of the Colombia to determine the obligations of States under the right to life in Article 4 
and the right to humane treatment in Article 5 of the American Convention, in relation to the 
scope of application as defined in Article 1 para. 1 and Article 2.144 The Court recognized an 
‘irrefutable relationship’ between the protection of the environment and the realisation of 
human rights.145 The Court noted that the right to a healthy environment was expressly 
recognised in Article 11 of the San Salvador Protocol and that this right should form part of the 
economic, social and cultural rights protected by Article 26 of the American Convention. Based 
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on this, the Court determined concrete obligations from the duties to respect the rights to life 
and personal integrity in the context of environmental protection. In particular, the Court ruled 
that States are obligated to prevent significant environmental damage within and outside their 
territory and must take preventive action including carrying out environmental impact 
assessments, mitigating environmental damage and acting in line with the precautionary 
principle. Notably, the Court emphasised this obligation to take precautionary measures to 
protect the right to life in the event of ‘possible serious and irreversible damage to the 
environment, even in the absence of scientific certainty.’146 Protecting human rights in 
environmental context also requires States to ensure access to justice, in relation to the state 
obligations for the protection of the environment. 
In Canada, ENvironment JEUnesse has filed an application for authorisation to bring a class 
action on behalf of all Quebec young people under the age of 35, seeking the judiciary to 
declare that the Canadian government violates the rights of young people as protected under 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and 
Freedoms.147  
In Pandey v India, a nine year old claimant filed a petition with the National Green Tribunal in 
India, claiming that the Public Trust Doctrine, India’s obligations under the Paris Agreement and 
the existing environmental laws, in particular on environmental impact assessment, demand 
greater consideration of and action on climate change.148  
Finally, a famous and successful claim was brought by Ashgar Leghari, a farmer from Pakistan. 
He claimed that the delay of the national and regional governments in implementing the 
‘National Climate Change Policy 2012’ and the ‘Framework for Implementation of Climate 
Change Policy (2014-2013) violated the fundamental rights of citizens: the  right to life in Article 
9, the right to human dignity Article 19A and right to property in Article 23 under the 
constitution of Pakistan. The Lahore High Court held in 2015, that the delay of the government 
violated the fundamental rights of the claimant and the citizens of Pakistan. According to the 
Court, the human right to life included the right to a healthy and clean environment.  
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The above summary demonstrates that the global nature of the climate challenge might 
contribute to the complexity of climate cases, however, it does also lend itself to remarkably 
comparative approaches of courts in an inter-jurisdictional discourse. Successful cases are 
indeed able to nurture the reasoning of other courts. The very recent order of the Australian 
Land and Environment Court in Gloucester Resources Limited v Minster for Planning gives an 
example of this. The Court dismissed the appeal of the mining company Gloucester Resources 
Limited against the decision of the Ministry which denied consent to develop the Rocky Hill Coal 
Project. The decision of the Court references the Urgenda decision of the Hague Court of 
Appeal and integrates the Hague court’s responses to the defences of the State in rebutting 
similar arguments of the mining company in relation to the significance of emissions, causation 
and carbon leakage.149 
3. Resolving the accountability issue through rights protection? 
The commitment to a global temperature goal and internationally stipulated GHG emission 
reduction targets does not answer the question how these relate to domestic climate action 
and whether these targets can be enforced in national courts against governments. How 
become GHG emission reduction targets operational, and to whom should governments be 
accountable, to their citizens, their parliaments, or the international community as a whole?  
 
Human rights obligations require positive action of States. For instance, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) recognises the right to life, understood as ‘the 
supreme right from which no derogation is permitted even in time of public emergency which 
threatens the life of the nation’.150 It entails that States take protection measures, for instance 
to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy.151 Climate Change concretises the 
necessary actions of States under other Human rights instruments, such as the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child.152 Given the requirement to actively protect human rights in the specific 
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context of climate change, human rights obligations may provide the legal basis for claims 
against States for inadequate climate protection and thus contribute to clarifying one 
accountability avenue. 
 
Courts will have to address the challenge of making human rights operational to enforce 
climate accountability. This entails identifying the standard and timeframe to measure their 
governments’ climate action. 
In Urgenda, the Hague Court of Appeal used international environmental standards, which are 
stipulated by scientific evidence and endorsed by international agreements and Parties 
decisions thereunder to define the standard of the State’s human rights obligation. The human 
rights obligation becomes operational and enforces the environmental standard. The role of 
short-term and mid-term targets is to act as indicators that the long-term target and hence the 
temperature goal for the end of this century can be met. Thus, based on the duty of care the 
government is accountable if it is at risk of not achieving the long-term target, either because of 
a lack of ambition in setting interim targets or as a result of not meeting such a target. This 
rationale entails that human rights will be conducive to resolving the question of how to hold 
governments to account for outcome duties in relation to Climate Change.153  
How is the standard for this outcome duties defined, are the internationally framed reduction 
requirements the main driver, or the fact that the State itself used to embrace higher ambition 
up until 2011, or both? The above analysis has demonstrated that the Hague Court of Appeal 
takes account of the internationally stipulated reduction targets, however, it also acknowledges 
that up until 2011, the State had adopted a target of 30% because this was ‘necessary to stay 
on a credible track to keep the 2° C objective within reach’.154 The Netherlands subsequently 
lowered its ambition to 20% in accordance with the EU-wide target. Had Urgenda framed its 
claim differently, would current international law require a higher target?   
The judgment is not clear at this point and admittedly, the Hague Court of Appeal did not have 
to answer this question, as it was bound by the claimants’ submission. The conceptual difficulty 
in identifying a concrete and even higher emission reduction target at the international level 
which could then be applied in national law is the result of a paradox of climate change law: the 
existence of an internationally agreed long-term global temperature goal that is to be achieved 
with NDCs, a legal approach that manifests itself in Article 4 of the Paris Agreement. It 
effectively bases concrete international obligations on reductions and limitations of greenhouse 
                                                          
153 For a discussion how new ‘outcome duties’ under the Climate and Child Poverty Acts of the UK can 
enforced see Colin T Reid, ‘A New Sort of Duty? The Significance of “Outcome” Duties in the Climate 
Change and Child Poverty Acts’ (2012) 4 Public Law 749, 757. 
154 Dutch Court of Appeal para. 52. 
gases on the self-perception of States. Moreover, while the international obligation to submit 
their most ambitious NDC is binding on States and emphasises their duty to prepare, 
communicate and maintain their contribution and pursue the related domestic mitigation 
measures, there is a good faith expectation but no legal obligation to achieve a certain result.155 
Thus, for a court applying an internationally agreed emission reduction target on the basis of a 
State’s NDC, the dilemma is twofold: the international target based on States’ NDCs remains 
rooted in the self-perception of the State with the risk that the State might make the claim that 
it has lost the capacity to act in line with the NDC, and not all NDCs may represent a clear 
outcome duty in from of a quantified emission reduction target. Nevertheless, taking the lead 
in setting economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets is one of the strong expectations 
that the Agreement sets forth for developed country Parties to the Paris Agreement.156 These 
quantified targets establish subsequently the international benchmark for the submitting State. 
Thus, submitting such a quantified target creates international law on climate change and 
makes it at the same time operational. The next question is then whether or not a State 
continues to be bound by its own ambition, internationally and nationally. The Hague Court of 
Appeal has not allowed the Netherlands to adjust its national target downwardly, because of its 
human rights obligations which demand that the global temperature goal can realistically be 
achieved. The Court has attached significant importance to the self-perception that the State 
had until 2011 and not allowed the State to be less ambitious now. This accords with current 
international law: it is a normative expectation of the Paris Agreement, that a Party’s 
‘successive national determined contributions will represent a progression beyond the Party’s 
then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition’.157 
The Agreement only provides for adjusting NDCs with a view to enhancing the level of 
ambition.158 It would be difficult to argue that despite the wording of this provision, a situation 
may arise in which a Party to the Paris Agreement can claim that it lawfully replaced a 
nationally determined contribution subsequently with a less ambitious target.159  
International law will determine the timeframe under which accountability occurs. The 
remaining carbon budget160 under the Paris Agreement that allows a certain amount of GHG 
                                                          
155 Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnee, Lavanya Rajamani (ed), International Climate Change Law (Oxford 
2017), 231. 
156 Article 4 para 4 of the Agreement, see also Article 3 para 1 of the UNFCCC, see further Petra 
Minnerop, ‘Taking the Paris Agreement forward: continuous Strategic Decision-making on Climate 
Action by the Meeting of the Parties’ (2017) 21 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 124, 133. 
157 Paris Agreement, Article 4(3). 
158 Article 4 para 11. 
159 See for a further discussion Lavanya Rajamani and Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Legality of Downgrading 
Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement: Lessons from the US Disengagement’ 
(2017) 29 JEL 537, 543. 
160 The IPCC defines the remaining carbon budget as follows: ‘Estimated cumulative net global 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions from a given start date to the time that anthropogenic CO2 emissions 
emissions while still resulting, at some probability, in limiting the global temperature increase in 
accordance with Article 2(1)(a) of the Agreement, will play a decisive role in identifying the 
point in time at which accountability may be enforceable in Court. The Paris Agreement 
acknowledges that accountability is closely related to the time factor. Progression of Parties’ 
efforts over time and increasing ambition is woven into the fabric of the Agreement. It sets out 
five yearly cycles of global stocktaking, expects that subsequent NDCs are more ambitious than 
the previous target  and requires all Parties (except the least developed country Parties) to 
submit biennially national inventory reports of anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks.161 Parties have agreed that only with the achievement of interim targets will 
the global goal of limiting temperature increase to well below 2° C or even 1.5° C be attainable. 
This entails a dual accountability: that targets are ambitious enough at every stage to reach the 
next target, and that States are on track to achieve their targets in the short-, mid-, and long-
term.   
III. Conclusion  
This second judgment in Urgenda sits well with the underlying rationale of the positive 
obligation doctrine of the ECtHR on environmental protection based on human rights. Under 
the Dutch constitution, Article 2 and Article 8 are directly applicable and the Hague Court of 
Appeal follows the rule of law in applying these provisions to a concrete environmental 
challenge, albeit one that has not yet come before the Strasbourg Court. In defining the 
standard for the duty of care, the Hague Court of Appeal follows the fashion of the Strasbourg 
Court, it spells out what the State has to do to avoid a breach with its human rights obligations 
and leaves it to the State to decide how to comply with the decision.  
Urgenda is also part of a wider tide of case law that represents a judicial enquiry into 
government’s accountability for climate action on the basis of human rights. More research and 
more case law is necessary to establish that the global consensus on a temperature goal as 
enshrined in the Paris Agreement translates into an effective enforcement mechanism of 
individual States’ targets, derived from their nationally determined contributions, on the basis 
of human rights. However, applying human rights in the climate change context contributes to 
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161 Article 13 (7)(a) and 1/CP.21 para 90. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1. 
resolving the accountability issue of governments for outcome duties, such as achieving 
quantified greenhouse gas emission reduction targets. This accountability comprises both, 
ambition and achievement, in relation to the global temperature goal. Human rights stand in 
the way of adjusting a minimum threshold for mitigation downwardly. They also contribute to 
defining the point in time at which this accountability will occur. The Paris Agreement 
reinforces the expectation not only of increasing ambition over time but also that Parties 
remain obliged to maintain their nationally determined contributions and abstain from 
decreasing ambitions.  
The judgment of the Hague Court of Appeal reflects an advanced understanding of human 
rights and environmental obligations that corresponds with the expectations of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean 
healthy and sustainable environment (in the following Special Rapporteur on human rights and 
the environment) as expressed in the context of the Irish Climate case discussed above.162 It 
clarifies human rights obligations relating to climate change and illustrates the importance of 
domestic courts in achieving climate justice.163 The Hague Court of Appeal has set an example 
of good practice in the use of human rights obligations relating to the environment: it 
integrates human rights and environmental standards.164 This entails the protection of 
substantive environmental standards but also effective procedural measures such as access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings.165 Only then can effective judicial protection on the 
basis of human rights offer ‘a safety net to protect against gaps in statutory laws and create 
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163 See the Report of the International Bar Association ‘Achieving Justice and Human Rights in an Era of 
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opportunities for better access to justice’.166  This holds especially true in the absence of an 
explicit right to a healthy environment. While explicit recognition of a right to a healthy 
environment has proven for many countries to be advantageous in the balancing of 
development needs and environmental standards,167 Urgenda illustrates that it is not a 
necessary condition for the effective use of human rights law in climate litigation. This 
represents State practice and as such, the decision may strengthen the argument that States 
are indeed prepared to follow the recommendation of the UN Special Rapporteur on human 
rights and the environment and recognise a right to a healthy environment in a global 
instrument.168 
 
IV. Brief summary: the reasoning of the Hague District Court and the 
Hague Court of Appeal in a nutshell 
The Hague District Court 
Article 34 ECHR stands in the way of direct application of Article 2 and 8 ECHR. 
The existence of the ‘duty of care’ is based on the Dutch Civil Code (Book 6, section 162) and 
the violation of such a duty of care may constitute a tortious act. 
The standard of care is derived from the hazardous negligence jurisprudence of the Dutch 
Supreme Court and the risk of climate change impacts. 
Article 2 and 8 and their interpretation given by the ECtHR serve as a source of interpretation 
when implementing open private-law standards. 
Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution does not provide certainty about the manner in which the 
duty of care should be exercised.  
These provisions and the objectives of international climate action are relevant in determining 
the minimum degree of this duty of care: they determine to a great extent the framework for 
and the manner in which the State exercises its powers. 
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enjoyment of a safe, clean and healthy and sustainable environment’, 24 January 2018, UN GA 
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The Hague District Court orders that the State must achieve a minimum GHG emission 
reduction target of 25% by 2020. 
 
The Hague Court of Appeal 
The Hague Court of Appeal confirmed that the State is under a duty of care to achieve a 
minimum emission reduction target of 25% by 2020 compared with 1990, but based on a 
conceptually different legal reasoning. 
The existence of the duty of care is based on Article 2 and 8 ECHR as directly applicable law 
under the Dutch constitution. 
This corresponds with the ‘doctrine of positive obligations’ as applied by the ECtHR in 
environmental contexts. 
The standard of the duty of care is defined in accordance with the scientific evidence which has 
been expressed in a global temperature goal, international agreements and the history of Dutch 
emission reduction targets.  
The reduction target of at least 25% must be met to ensure that the 2° C temperature goal of 
the Paris Agreement will be achievable. 
Emitting above this target violates the State’s human rights obligations. 
The State has a margin of appreciation as to how to achieve compliance with the order of the 
Hague Court of Appeal. 
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